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1. In the preface to On Certainty Anscombe and von Wright 
say that in 1949 Malcolm suggested to Wittgenstein to think 
again about Moore’s “Defense of Common Sense” (1925) 
and “Proof of an External World” (1939). Malcolm himself 
had written on the issue in “Defending Common Sense” 
(1949). In the preface to the Philosophical Investigations 
Wittgenstein quotes Nestroy saying that there is usually very 
little progress in philosophy. But I think some progress has 
been made from Moore and Malcolm to Wittgenstein 
regarding skepticism. There is more awareness of practice 
and perspective and this opens the discussion in novel 
ways. But it also gives rise to new problems, in particular 
regarding morality and cultural relativity. I will introduce 
conceptions of inner and outer relativity and of relative and 
hierarchical systematicity, and this will lead me to criticize 
one-sided therapy readings. Rule following should not be too 
blind. 
2. The progress I see consists in a certain opening-up of 
horizon and discussion and is the result of the introduction 
of language games and basic practices. Languages and 
practices change over time and there is more than one of 
them. Such plurality also fits our time. We now do not only 
have Descartes’ dream scenario or the much earlier 
butterfly dream of Zhuangzi, but we also have experiments 
with rubber-hands and ideas about brains in vats and 
whole visions about a Matrix. Things can be imagined to 
change gradually. You could be placed into a vat tomor-
row, so that your memories would still be true and only 
new impressions wrong. Maybe this happened to you 
already yesterday, last week, or ten years ago. Thus 
gradual change can be imagined and it is not an all-or-
nothing game any more. 
3. The new picture Wittgenstein offers gives up ideas of 
strict hierarchy (H) and clear precision of rules and appli-
cation. It gives up what I call “H-systematicity”. In its place 
it emphasizes mutual dependency between rules and 
application, leading to what I call “inner relativity” and “R-
systematicity”. Thus Wittgenstein talks of houses carrying 
their foundations (On Certainty 248). Everything depends 
on everything else within the system. “What stands fast 
does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convinc-
ing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it.” Was 
feststeht, tut dies nicht, weil es an sich offenbar oder 
einleuchtend ist, sondern es wird von dem, was darum 
herum liegt, festgehalten (OC 144). “I have arrived at the 
rock bottom of my convictions. And one might almost say 
that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole 
house.” Ich bin auf dem Boden meiner Überzeugungen 
angelangt. Und von dieser Grundmauer könnte man 
beinahe sagen, sie werde vom ganzen Haus getragen (OC 
248). There is an inner relativity resulting from mutual 
dependency between everything and everything else 
within the system. Similarly Quine uses the metaphor of a 
Roman arch in which the stones support each other, and 
he argues that statements and believes are merely more 
or less central or peripheral. Wittgenstein talks of rivers, 
sandbanks, and riverbeds, all of which change gradually, 
such that, although there are still distinctions in terms of 
stability, these distinctions are only a matter of degree. 
There can be asymmetry, but there is no strict hierarchy. 
Within a system of beliefs and practices there is mutual 
dependency. The foundations (Grundmauer) carry the 
house, and the house (das ganze Haus) “carries” the 
foundations by keeping them in place through its mere 
weight. All parts support and depend on each other. A river 
carries water and the water brings sand and shapes the 
river (OC 96-9). This leads to “inner relativity”.  
According to Wittgenstein, to know our ways within a 
system and to participate in its practices we rely on our 
basic animal instincts and our sensitivities. (About the 
latter, see Alice Crary 2007.) Due to the relevance of such 
sensitivity also aesthetic aspects play a role here. (For a 
discussion of aesthetic aspects regarding meaning, see 
Wenzel 2010.) All this leads to what I think of as “open-
ness”. Instead of strict hierarchies based on axioms and 
derived propositions, or rules and meta-rules, we have to 
accept the fact that we live with such inner relativities and 
mutual dependencies within our system. (For a defense of 
the idea of indeterminacy as constitutive of our psycho-
logical lives, see ter Hark 2004.) 
Wittgenstein’s continued considerations of alternative 
possibilities and variations of our situation and practice 
make Moore’s approach seem overly narrow and fixed. 
Thus Rush Rhees observes that “the notion of a language 
game is not closed” (Rhees 9). Indeed, we can observe 
that there is a time index to language games: “a language 
game does change with time” Andererseits ändert sich das 
Sprachspiel mit der Zeit (OC 256); and there is also a 
space index: “I am in England. – Everything around me 
tells me so” Ich bin in England. – Alles um mich herum 
sagt es mir (OC 421). Thus indices introduce limitations, 
because “everything around me” is not really everything 
there is. When Wittgenstein writes: “I have no reason to 
doubt this. ‘Everything speaks in its favor and nothing 
against it’” Zum Zweifeln fehlen mir die Gründe! ‘Es spricht 
alles dafür, und nichts dagegen’ (OC 4, my translation), 
then he (intentionally) leaves room for doubt, because, 
again, “everything” in this context is not really everything 
there is. It is only everything we have encountered so far. 
4. In his 1925 paper, Moore gave a list of basic statements 
that he thought we all “know, with certainty, to be true” 
(106). These are statements about our own body, things 
around us, other bodies, the earth, our perceptions, 
expectations, beliefs, and such. Although nobody knows 
their exact analyses, they are “unambiguous” and we all 
understand their meanings (111). Doubting them, he 
argued, would introduce ambiguity and self-contradiction. 
But Moore got involved in sense-data analysis (128-132) 
and he thought, differently from Russell, it seems to me, 
that the existence of the external world is not just our best 
hypothesis. He wanted more, and certainly he did not like 
ambiguity. In his 1939 paper he analyzed the Kantian 
expressions “the existence of things outside of us” (147) 
and “things external to our minds” (149); and he did not 
find them very clear and offered his own famous proof of 
the existence of the external world by holding up his hands 
and saying: “Here is one hand … and here is another” 
(166). This he thought he knows for sure, even though he 
admitted that he cannot give a proof. (Kant actually had 
thought to have given a proof in his Refutation of Idealism, 
in terms of self-consciousness, time and space, the 
categories, and apperception. But Moore, unfortunately, 
did not say anything about this.)  
How does Wittgenstein compare with this? I think he 
was impressed by Moore’s honesty and sincerity but not 
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by his conception of statements and ambiguity. For Witt-
genstein statements have meaning only in contexts, and 
these are more varied and indeterminate in his view than 
in Moore’s. Contextual “inner relativity” and openness 
surface more in Wittgenstein, and he has less trust in 
abstract argument and deduction. When you carry, so to 
speak, a word, or statement, from one context to another, 
it will change its face and assume a slightly different 
meaning. Hence abstract argument and deduction easily 
go wrong. 
5. But such inner relativity leads to problems of what I want 
to call “outer relativity”. Outer relativity arises when differ-
ent systems with their language games and practices 
meet. Whereas inner relativity is based on mutual depend-
ency within a single system, outer relativity is marked by 
mutual independence between different systems. You do it 
your way, I do it my way (or we do it our way). You have 
your language game and your practice, I have mine (or we 
have ours). Unfortunately, this easily gives rise to conflict, 
and it seems to me Wittgenstein does not much address 
this problem. 
The question I want to pose therefore is this: Which 
system would fare better and be more suitable (or maybe 
even be morally better) when different cultures and word 
views come into contact with each other, one that is based 
more on inner relativity (R) or one that is based more on 
hierarchy and ideas of precision and completeness (H)? 
Thus we have turned Wittgenstein’s descriptive picture into 
a question about normativity. We ask whether it is enough 
to point to our basic practices when asked for justification. 
Can we just say that this is simply what we do? What I 
mean by “normativity” here is not only the nature of norms 
as taught by others, how to count or how to use certain 
words. About that Wittgenstein had already written with 
respect to rule-following. The normativity I have in mind 
here is moral normativity, the question of what we should 
do when meeting another person with a background 
unknown to us and when moral conflict arises. How should 
be behave in such a situation? Here the norms are not 
readily available. 
Medina 2004 has argued that Wittgenstein’s reflections 
about enculturation and internalization of norms go beyond 
Quine’s naturalism. They allow us to see for instance how 
chimpanzees can be said to learn how to follow rules (86). 
Ter Hark 2004 has even suggested specific traces from 
Darwin’s The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals 
in Wittgenstein’s reflections about facial expressions. All 
this is helpful, but I think it is too much limited to behavior-
istic and descriptive aspects. What is missing is the moral 
aspect. There are situations when we reflect about what to 
do regarding other people, and in such situations we take 
ourselves to be responsible for what we do. This act of 
taking responsibility involves considerations of autonomy. 
It requires abstraction, idealization, and reflexive aware-
ness of rules. It requires visions of ideal situations. This, I 
think, goes beyond R-systematicity and cannot fully be 
grasped by mere description and behaviorism. It is in this 
context that H-systematicity matters, at least tentatively, 
reflectively, and in regulative ways, and this, it seems to 
me, is missing in Wittgenstein and his emphasis on what I 
have called R-systematicity. Situations of moral conflict are 
often new and unfamiliar to us, and when finding ourselves 
in such situations we cannot simply rely on our habits and 
familiar practices. This would not solve intercultural or 
inter-religious conflicts. To the contrary, it would make 
them worse.  
6. One can find in Wittgenstein certain aesthetic and 
ethical elements. There is sensitivity for the particular 
situation and hesitancy in passing judgment. This can be 
good and commendable, especially when meeting other 
cultures, or an individual that comes from a social back-
ground unfamiliar to us. But two problems arise. First, the 
demand on sensitivity can be too high. Second, it is 
questionable whether such sensitivity and awareness of 
language games and practices would be enough, and 
whether old ideas of hierarchy and precision can be given 
up. I doubt this. I think we always need ideas of exactness, 
rules, and hierarchy, especially when meeting people from 
unfamiliar cultures. After all, we cannot learn all the prac-
tices and languages of different cultures. We cannot live in 
Kirchberg am Wechsel, Paris, and Taipei, or in New York 
City, Mahapalipuram, and the Amazon rainforest at the 
same time. This is simply impossible. We cannot be 
habituated and sensitive to all these cultures and forms of 
life. We cannot all learn Chinese, French, and Tamil, and 
be sensitive to all the nuances of using words and of 
reading facial expressions. But sometimes we do meet 
people from such places and have to interact with them. 
Thus relying on practice is not enough. Germans living in 
Japan will easily find that many things are expected not to 
be said directly, or even not at all. But Japanese don’t see 
it this way. They easily read between the lines. Besides the 
problem of understanding, there is also the problem of 
evaluation. We don’t assume that all practices are equally 
good and commendable. We compare them and for such 
comparison dialog and criteria are necessary, for which in 
turn ideas of H-systematicity are needed in various reflec-
tive and regulative ways. Such ideas can be useful to 
avoid conflict, to avoid blind reliance on one’s own practice 
(R) as well as blind attempts to turn the other, unfamiliar 
system (be it R or H) upside down, by force, or war. Rule-
following should not be that blind. Instead, hypothetical 
and reflective thinking and argumentation are necessary, 
and drill (Abrichtung, as Wittgenstein often saw teaching) 
is not enough.  
7. These considerations cast a new light on recent therapy 
readings. Mere therapy, the view that our metaphysical 
ideas about hierarchy, essence, and precision are mis-
guided and that we should be cured of them, might turn 
out to be one-sided, if not false, no matter whether Witt-
genstein meant his considerations this way or not. Thus I 
think the therapy reading should not be overdone. And 
what metaphysics is meant here? Kantian categories for 
instance are not as fixed and determinate as one might 
think. They are vague and in need of application (schema-
tization). So are Kantian concepts of time and space, 
original synthetic apperception, sensibility and under-
standing. Kant already was aware of the infinite regress 
problem in rule applications and he spoke of Mutterwitz 
(mother whit) and Abrichtung (drill) in this context (A 133-
4). But this did not stop him from undertaking the project of 
transcendental philosophy. His theory of judgments of 
taste is even more open in many ways, despite of its 
systematic character. Thus I think there is no need for 
therapy here. Maybe we instead need a counter therapy 
for such fashionable therapy-readings. Also the idea of 
wider concepts of rationality that encompasses sensitivity 
and emotions, although it has much to recommend itself, 
should not be carried too far.  
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